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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to interrogate the nexus between incumbency 
factor, internal party democracy and democratic consolidation in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic. Abundance evidence suggest that Incumbency factor and 
internal party democracy exercise monumental influence on the growth of 
democracy in Nigeria.
The paper adopts a conceptual and qualitative methodology. The researcher 
collected the data through the secondary sources. Thus, relevant materials 
including textbooks, journal articles, party constitutions and the 1999 
constitution of Nigeria were consulted in the quest to establish the linkages. 
The assertion was substantiated and buttressed by the data. The research 
unveiled that abuse of incumbency advantage and lack of internal party 
democracy constitute major drawbacks to democratic consolidation in 
Nigeria. 
Adducing convincing evidence, the paper established ̀ the relationship between 
incumbency factor, internal party democracy and democratic consolidation 
in Nigeria. The paper is particularly imperative for stakeholders in Nigeria’s 
democratic experience as it would make them to be conscious  and refrain 
from  abuse of incumbency and adhere to the doctrines of internal party 
democracy in order to fast track democratic growth and consolidation in 
Nigeria.
Keywords: Incumbency, internal party democracy, election, democratic 
consolidation, Nigeria. 
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INTRODUCTION
Several works started to examine the possible dynamics of incumbency dating 
back to the early 1970s. Such works include Erikson 1971, Ferejohn 197, 
Fiorina 1977. Since then, researchers began to delve into the study of factors 
responsible for this development. These explanations entails institutional 
characteristics like legislative case work, legislative activism, advertising, 
replacement among others (Carson, 2015). Others contend that behavioural 
explanations are more plausible (Carson 2015). Other works emphasized on 
the role of donations and money (Abramowitz 1989:1991).
The advantages of incumbency are inconsistent. Cox and Katz (1996) 
argued that the incumbency advantage is made up direct and indirect effects. 
The direct effect is simply the perquisites attached to being an incumbent 
such as resources and constituency projects. The indirect effects comprise 
the tendency and ability to deter high quality opponent or challenger in 
future elections. Cox and Katz (1996) posit that the phenomenal increase in 
incumbency advantages stem from the rise in the quality effects. 
While the bulk of the study on the incumbency advantage centre on the 
period from 1960 onward, earlier studies indicate there is indeed evidence of 
incumbency advantage in the earlier periods (Gerald and Gross 1984). It has 
been observed in recent time that incumbency advantage could ebb and flow 
in the course of time (Carson 2015). Buttressing this stance, Jacobson (2015) 
aptly demonstrated that current members of congress are less disadvantaged 
than their counterparts between 1960 and 2010. He avers that incumbents in 
quest of office in contemporary epoch enjoy no more of an advantage than 
those contesting in the 1950s. This, he noted, is a function of the growing 
nationalization of politics.
In view of the above, it is evident that those who have been occupying 
political offices in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, like their counterparts 
in the First, Second and the stillborn Third Republic have been abusing 
incumbency advantage in their style of governance. This has offered gross 
advantage over their opponents and challengers. This is evident in the way 
they hijack the affairs and structures of their parties which has led to abysmal 
lack of internal party democracy. However, lending credence to Jacobson’s 
(2015) assertion, incumbency advantage has waxed and waned in Nigeria’s 
political experience. It could not facilitate Obasanjo’s Third Term bid and 
also failed to grant victory to President Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 
elections.
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With increasing national and political consciousness among the 
electorates, governance, rather than incumbency advantage in going to be 
deciding variables in securing electoral victory in Nigeria’s democratic 
experience (Alfa 2011). In view of this, the purpose and objective of the 
paper is to establish the interface between incumbency factor, internal party 
democracy and democratic consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In political lexicon, incumbency refers to holders of political office that 
enjoy certain perquisites which are not available to other competitors or 
challengers in the electoral struggle. These privileges, which includes but 
not restricted to such advantages like wider media coverage, security, use of 
state resources and instruments of coercion, provides some electoral edge for 
the occupants of such offices certain advantages on their counterparts. This is 
particularly when they seek re-election or intend to facilitate the election of 
their preferred successors (Kwasau 2013, Jaja and Alumona 2011).
Incumbency advantage typically refers to the electoral margin 
a candidate enjoys because of his/her status as an incumbent running for 
re-election (Carson 2015). A wide range of literature in American politics 
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s has documented the existence of such 
margin- first in congressional elections. These include (Erikson 1971, 
Mayhew 1974, and in the recent time Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002). Some 
scholars also look at the advantages of incumbency but they still tend to point 
at the same direction (Gordon and Landa 2009).
It has been observed that politicians who make policy choices more 
congruent with voters’ preferences are likely to win their support (Ferejohn 
1986, Bueno de Mesquita and Landa 2008). Some win as a result of signals 
of their underlying quality in adverse elections model. Others look at their 
policy efforts prior to the elections (Banks and Sundaram 1998, Herron and 
Shotts 2001, Besley 2006). 
There are other factors such as the office holder advantage which 
results from their access to the power of the office and constituency service 
(Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Goodliffe 2005). Another explanation is 
the pro-incumbent endorser which occurs because uninformed voters may 
simply rely on the endorsement from the powerful and influential elites or 
pressure groups when making decisions on who to vote for (McKelvey and 
Ordeshook 1985, Wittman 2007). The incumbents give assurance to the elites 
or build ties with them. As such, the elites work in their favour (Grossman 
and Helpman 1999).
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The pro-incumbent district partisan perspective implies the ideological 
disposition of the incumbent’s constituency. In this case, there seem to be a 
bond and the incumbent is likely to have an edge on his/her challenger if the 
same electorates are to choose from among the candidates who voted for his/
her in the first instance (Hirano and Snyder 2009). 
The candidate selection or nomination procedure also affect voting 
pattern (Bueno de Mesquita 2008). In the event that the voters choose to 
vote for higher quality candidate, there is the likelihood of voting for the 
incumbent who is known to them except if the challenger is well known 
as well (Ansolabehere, Hirano, Snyder and Ueda 2006). This kind of 
coincidence explains the Nigerians vote for the challenger to incumbent,that 
is President Buhari over the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan in the 
2015 elections since Buhari is not a strange person on the Nigeria’s political 
landscape having earned himself a reputation for anti-corruption policies 
when he held sway as a military ruler between 1983-1985.
In legislative institution, there is a popularbelief that seniority and 
experience enhance the electoral chances of the incumbents as voters prefer 
them to new entrants (McKelvey and Riezman 1992, Fiorina and Rivers 
1989). Interestingly too, the electoral chances of the incumbent could scare 
some persons from venturing into the race for fear of being defeated by 
the incumbent who appear difficult to beat (Lazarus 2008). In some cases, 
however, some incumbents could also resign and refrain from participating 
in the race for fear of being defeated (Carson 2005). Given the presence of 
likely electoral consequences, the elites make a decision concerning their 
readiness to either support the incumbent or not (Hill 2003).
Internal party democracy means that a political party has impersonal 
rules and procedures to avoid the arbitrary control of internal elections and 
party functioning by individual leaders or cliques. Such rules must also 
be put into practice, otherwise a party is neither institutionalized nor truly 
democratic. It also implies that all components and functionaries follow due 
process and are accountable to the rank and file as well as the lawful organs 
established in the states (IMD 2004).
On consolidation of democracy, scholars vary in their postulations on 
what it is and on what it is not A consolidated democracy is one in which no 
major groups want to overthrow it, the people want to keep it (even in times 
of crisis), and democratic rules have been institutionalized. Consequently, 
there is no consensus among scholars regarding the essential requirements 
but they all conclude with the general agreement that such a phenomenon 
abound and can be seen, even if it is difficult to describe them Linz and 
Stepan (1996).
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 O’Donnell (1996) contends that democracy is consolidated when there 
is an alternation of power between two rival parties, support for the system is 
continued during time of economic hardship, rebellious elements are defeated 
and sanctioned, there is stability of the regime even if the party system is 
restructured and there is no significant political anti-system. Schmitter (1992) 
asserts that a democracy is consolidated when social relations become a form 
of social value and patterns of interaction can become so regular in their 
occurrence, so imbued with meaning, so capable of motivating behaviour 
so much so that they become autonomous in their internal function and 
resists externally propelled change. The process of consolidation is said to 
be complete when there is conscious adoption of democratic institutions, 
processes and values by the political class and the entire citizens in a political 
system (Gunther, Diamondourous and Puhle 1995).
FINDINGS/ DISCUSSION
In Nigeria, incumbency factor encourages the appointment of venal electoral 
officials used to rig elections, perversion of the electoral laws and institutional 
guidelines, manipulation of electoral tribunals, use of the security agents to 
silence opposition to manipulate elections, curtailing access to state-owned 
media outfits in their quest to stay beyond their constitutional term, thwart 
their party agreements or ensure the emergence of their favoured successor 
(Jaja and Alumona 2011, Tenuche 2011, Alfa and Momoh 2011).
The very conceptualization of politics by the Nigerian political elites 
is very ambiguous. Politics is not seen as an opportunity to serve the people 
but rather as a crude contest to attain state power and all its paraphernalia , a 
zero-sum game whereby if one wins, he wins everything and if he loses, he 
lost everything. It is a game that is seen as a matter “of life and death”. This 
is because of the patron-client relationship and the prebendal hallmark of the 
polity. As Joseph (1987) asserts, prebendal politics exemplifies the political 
environment whereby the state are exploited as benefits by the holders.
Like in most parts of Africa, politics in Nigeria is seen as a means of 
primitive capital accumulation (Adejumobi 1997). Such patrimonial states 
are the cheapest means of private accumulation of wealth and accounts for 
why elections for the control of the state as well as its apparatus are so crude 
and violent (Adejumobi 1997). The holders of public offices use them as 
avenues for the advancement of their status, power and wealth. They use such 
offices to accumulate wealth and resources for personal aggrandizement. The 
authoritarian and violent posture of the colonial state was transplanted in 
the post-colonial era. The state, as such, became an object of plunder for 
politicians and their loyalists (Diamond 1995). 
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In post-colonial Nigeria, politics was conceived as a crude struggle 
for the appropriation of the nation’s wealth, a tendency that has made good 
governance and accountability very remote in the 1960s.  Consequently, 
political competition between individual politicians as well as between 
political parties were fraught with thuggery, hooliganism and violence; 
government at every stratum lacked transparency and public accountability, 
rule of law and checks and balances. Fundamental liberty of the people were 
grossly impinged upon by incumbents of public offices who employed all 
forms of atavistic ploys to silence opposition and perpetuate their rule. There 
were electoral malpractices and government was ran against popular will. 
As matter of fact, the pursuit of power was to facilitate the appropriation of 
the ‘national cake’ by the politicians through the instrumentality of the state 
(Adejumobi 1997). 
Since the state has been debased, electoral competition became 
characterised by antidemocratic tendencies and lack the ideals of democracy 
in choosing and removing governments from power. Those who took over 
power from the colonial masters remained autocratic and continued to employ 
the instruments of coercion to repress, oppress and weaken opposition parties 
and groups. This culminated in hollow and superficial democracy as the rules 
became fragile (Diamond, 1995).
The politics of the 1960s became inevitably characterised by intrigues, 
violence, intimidation, suspicion and politically related killings. Opposition 
was undermined by political gerrymandering. These were the high points 
of the Action Group and the crisis in the Western Region in 1962 (Kayode 
2013). The creation of the Mid-West Region in 1963 was a ploy by the 
incumbent NPC government at the Federal level to neutralize the political 
influence of the Action Group and its leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 
the West. Orchestrated by the federal centre, the Western Region became 
embroiled in the crisis that contributed to the collapse of the First Republic 
(Osaghe 2000). 
After the military completed its transition programme and handed 
over power to the democratically elected government of President Shehu 
Shagari in the Second Republic ( 1979- 1983), the political parties manifested 
themselves to be the reincarnation of the First Republic political parties 
and the same political gladiators dominated the leadership of the political 
. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was famous in the North like the 
Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was 
the reincarnation of the Action Group (A. G) in the West while the Nigeria 
Peoples’ Party (NPP) was an offshoot of the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC) which was predominantly dominated by the Easterners 
(Dode 2012).
JGD  Vol. 13, Issue 2, July 2017, 61-74
67
Among the parties in the First Republic, only the NPC, and to a little 
extent, the GNPP could be said to have demonstrated a measure of national 
outlook and spread in terms of their membership composition. The rest 
manifested gross primordial and ethnic characteristics. The politicians were 
mostly in the art of intrigues, deceit, lack of sincerity and they manipulated 
this to sustain themselves in power (Report of the Political Bureau, 1987: 
Chapter 2).
In the Second Republic, the NPN-led government engaged in gross 
accumulation and mismanagement of state resources between1979-1983. 
In order to sustain its rule, the NPN-led government perpetrated a lot of 
electoral rigging and inflation of votes using the police to intimidate and 
silence the opposition camp. The then Inspector General of Police, Sunday 
Adewusi deployed massive number of police personnel to oppress opposition 
especially in the states with weak support the NPN. The NPN rigged the 
election to its advantage to win the 1983 general elections under controversial 
circumstances, a situation which created a fertile and tenable ground for the 
military to intervene and topple the government (Joseph 1987). 
In Nigeria, it has been observed that elected officials have been 
demonstrating insensitivity to the plight of the electorates. This is due to 
the fact they offer financial inducement to the electorates to buy their votes. 
This makes them to be unaccountable to the electorates. The high rate of 
illiteracy and poverty also makes the populace to be enfeebled in demanding 
accountability from the public office holders (IDEA 2006). 
In order to achieve the desired victory during electoral competition, 
politicians and political parties, especially the incumbents hijack the electoral 
body in order to mastermind the outcome. No matter the voting pattern, 
politicians and political parties in power use the electoral commission to 
pervert the popular will of the people (Birch 2011, Agbaje and Adejumobi 
2006). The electoral agency and its officials are not politically neutral or 
impartial but vulnerable to the whims and caprices of the incumbent regime 
lacking every sense of autonomy. More often than not, incumbency factor 
remains an instrument of vote manipulation, rigging, and ballot stuffing 
for politicians in their quest to perpetuate their rule or succeed themselves. 
This has negated the credibility of elections in Nigeria (Iliffe 2011, Katsina 
2013).
 
Even though the abuse of incumbency and the lack of internal party 
democracy are often discussed within the context of civil or democratic rule, 
the Nigerian experience reveal the military also undertake some activities 
that perpetrate these twin cankerworms (Diamond 1997, Katsina 2013).
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Incumbency Factor, Internal party Democracy and Politics of the 
Aborted Third Republic
When Ibrahim Babangida assumed power in 1985, he embarked on a series 
of activities with the claim of having the intention to return the country to 
civil rule (Diamond, 1991). He lifted the ban on politics in May 1989 but 
the regime claimed it was dissatisfied with the actions of politicians in party 
formation as he alleged that the parties could not be registered due to their 
inherent inability to exhibit national character. Babangida created two political 
parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican 
Convention (NRC). The incumbent government provided the initial fund for 
the operations of these parties and even drafted their constitutions (Oyediran 
and Agbaje 1991). 
The Babangida’s regime acted autonomously in masterminding the 
transition programme with gross abuse of power. Capturing this development, 
(Keller 1991) contends that under Babangida “where state corporatism exists, 
the state attempts to co-opt corporate groups or eliminate them....it allows 
popular political expression, but only according to rules defined by the 
oligarchic state class...Rather than encouraging populist democracy to reign 
free, the state carefully limits and controls popular political and economic 
mobilization”.
After a series of proscription of politicians due to alleged irregularities 
in the conduct of their party primaries, the presidential election took place on 
June 12, 1993 with Chief MKO Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa as presidential 
flag bearers of the SDP and NRC respectively. But as Nigerians await the 
announcement of the election, Babangida announced its annulment.
During the Abacha era, of the eighteen political parties that applied 
for registration, only five were registered. These were the Congress for 
National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National 
Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), and the United Nigeria Congress Party 
(UNCP). Politicians were not given a level playing ground to aspire for 
political offices and politics was characterised by democratic deficits. The 
peak of this undemocratic display was the adoption of General Abacha, the 
incumbent Head of State and a serving military officer by the five political 
parties as their sole presidential candidate (Yaqub 2002). Abacha’s death in 
1998 ended that mockery of democracy.
During the regime of Olusegun Obasanjo who assumed power on 
May 29, 1999 after winning the presidential election of the Abdulsalami’s 
transition programme on the platform of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), 
Obasanjo displayed gross abuse of incumbency and outright disregard for the 
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principles and practice of internal party democracy (TMG 2007, Ikpe 2013). 
The leadership structure of the party was tilted towards his interest and he 
manipulated the removal and replacement of party chairmen according to 
his whims and caprices. This is what led to the appointment of his age-long 
friend, Dr Ahmadu Ali as PDP’s national chairman (Azeez 2009). 
 
Obasanjo hijacked the PDP structure and practically manipulated 
the affairs of the party to suit his selfish interest. He ensured that only his 
favoured candidates were nominated to contest elections on the party’s 
platform. In the cause of his third term agenda, he orchestrated the party’s 
re-registration exercise during which those he perceived were opposed to 
his bid were de-registered and frustrated out of the party. A striking example 
was that of his Vice, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar who had to pitch tent with the 
defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) (Mbah 2011). Though Obasanjo’s 
third term agenda did not materialize, he orchestrated the emergence of late 
Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’adua first as the PDP’ flag bearer and second as the 
president (Isumonah 2012 Adeniyi 2017).
The demise of President Yar’adua on May 5, 2010 led the emergence 
of his vice, Goodluck Jonathan as the president. Even though they was an 
internal arrangement concerning a zoning arrangement in the PDP that 
power shift back to the North when Jonathan ends the Yar’adua’s tenure, he 
was able use his incumbency advantage to circumvent that arrangement. As 
such, despite opposition, particularly from the north, he used his incumbency 
advantage as well as the influence of some powerful elites to clinch his party’s 
ticket.  However, that was not without a commitment that he would not seek 
re-election in 2015 (Ojuogbo 2015, Adeniyi 2017).
When Jonathan assumed power, he devoted his time engaging members 
of his party in crisis, imposing candidates on other members, thus forcing 
aggrieved ones to defect. His action polarised the party. When the time for 
the 2015 election approached, Jonathan reneged on his promise not to seek 
re-election and began to seek PDP’s mandate, closing the opportunity to all 
other aspirants and manipulated the party to adopt a consensus arrangement 
where he emerged as the sole candidate (Akinloye 2016, Adeniyi 2017). 
At the state levels, the party primaries were characterized by rancour 
and disagreements arising from party primaries aimed at candidate selection. 
Jonathan schemed the removal of party chairmen and emergence of his 
preferred candidate. Commenting on this, Obasanjo asserted that “a political 
party and its leadership, that condones corruption and engages discredited 
people to abuse and insult genuine, authentic and objective critics is a political 
party on the path of ruin and destruction; the Peoples’ Democratic Party must 
be rescued from the path , otherwise it will soon fade into history”. The party 
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did not entertain constructive criticisms no matter how objective (Obasanjo, 
2015).
Governors in the party were pitched against one another while 
supporters of the parties supported candidates of other political parties 
against PDP candidates. These instances could be seen in Lagos, Edo and 
Ondo states while credible candidates were disallowed in preference for 
candidates with questionable integrity (Okhaide 2012, Obasanjo 2015). The 
trend of abuse of incumbency factor and abysmal disregard for the tenets of 
internal party democracy continued in the Fourth Republic which ushered 
in with the handover of power to the democratically elected government on 
May 29, 1999.
CONCLUSION
When Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999 after a series of military 
interregnum and a tortuous transition programme, Nigerians welcomed the 
successful installation of the democratic government with euphoria. However, 
events in the country ever since then have left much to be desired. Instead 
of embarking on actions that would unite the people and build a united, 
politically stable, and prosperous Nigeria, those who have been occupying 
positions of authority have been abusing their incumbency advantage to 
overheat the polity and cause division among the citizens.
 
More often than not, incumbents strive to perpetuate their rule beyond 
their constitutionally allowed tenure and derail from the internal agreements 
of their party. They devise a plethora of antidemocratic antics to actualize their 
selfish agenda. These include hijacking the party structure, masterminding 
the emergence and removal of party leadership and re-registration exercise 
to deregister opponents and consensus arrangements. 
The Fourth Republic has witnessed increased and more entrenched 
antidemocratic operations of political parties, including the application of 
nondemocratic procedures in nominating party candidates. This has weakened 
party unity and institutionalization and negatively affects consolidation. It 
has led to fragmentation of parties and antiparty activities. The absence of 
internal party democracy reduces the commitment of party stalwarts and 
those of their supporters which negatively affect party cohesion, stability 
and performance  
Furthermore, there is democracy deficit in the internal running 
of the parties as powerful interests and forces often control their internal 
mechanisms and processes culminating in defection, parallel primaries and 
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litigation struggle among members of the same political party. These are 
transferred into the larger society during elections and robs the society of 
capable, industrious and transparent leadership as products of unjust and 
undemocratic leaders can never contribute meaningfully to democratic 
consolidation. 
In order to ensure a robust democratic consolidation in Nigeria, 
those who assume leadership positions in the country should refrain from 
abusing their incumbency advantage. They should be ready to vacate power 
at the expiration of their constitutionally allowed term; they should create 
a level playing ground for all contestants; they should not interfere in the 
affairs of political parties and the way and manner party positions are filled; 
they should honour their internal party arrangements and above all enforce 
the tenets of internal party democracy in order speed up genuine democratic 
consolidation in Nigeria.
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